ALGORITHMS AND HUMAN FREEDOM by Sloan, Robert H. & Warner, Richard
Masthead Logo Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 35 | Issue 4 Article 2
4-20-2019
ALGORITHMS AND HUMAN FREEDOM
Robert H. Sloan
Richard Warner
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized editor of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com, pamjadi@scu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert H. Sloan and Richard Warner, ALGORITHMS AND HUMAN FREEDOM, 35 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 1 (2019).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol35/iss4/2
  
 
1 
† Robert H. Sloan is the Professor and Head, Department of Computer Science, University of 
Illinois at Chicago. Partially supported by National Science Foundation Grant No. DGE-1069311. 
Richard Warner is a Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.   
ALGORITHMS AND HUMAN FREEDOM 
By Robert H. Sloan and Richard Warner † 
Predictive analytics such as data mining, machine learning, and 
artificial intelligence drive algorithmic decision making. Its “all-
encompassing scope already reaches the very heart of a functioning 
society”. Unfortunately, the legal system and its various tools 
developed around human decisionmakers cannot adequately 
administer accountability mechanisms for computer decision making. 
Antiquated approaches require modernization to bridge the gap 
between governing human decision making and new technologies. 
We divide the bridge-building task into three questions. First, 
what features of the use of predictive analytics significantly contribute 
to incorrect, unjustified, or unfair outcomes? Second, how should one 
regulate those features to make outcomes more acceptable? Third, how 
can one ensure that the use of predictive analytics sufficiently respects 
human freedom? We divide the bridge-building task into three 
questions. First, what features of the use of predictive analytics 
significantly contribute to “incorrect, unjustified, or unfair” 
outcomes? Second, how should one regulate those features to make 
outcomes more acceptable? Third, how can one ensure that the use of 
predictive analytics sufficiently respects human freedom?  You are not 
free when you are subject to the arbitrary will another, and predictive 
analytics is no exception. It violates your freedom when it pushes you 
down an arbitrary and capricious path.  
We answer the first question by “profiling” uses of predictive 
analytics. We adapt the idea of profiling people. A profile of a person 
is a summary of characteristics relevant to evaluating and predicting 
the person’s behavior. Our profile consists of five features that 
significantly affect the extent to which a system will yield “incorrect, 
unjustified, or unfair” decisions. We answer the second question by 
explaining how to control predictive systems by regulating the features 
the profile identifies. Along with others, we propose that a government 
agency regulate the use of predictive systems. The novel feature of our 
approach is the use of legal regulation to unify consumer demand in 
ways that create a type of norm extensive studied in game theory, a 
coordination norm.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
 Predictive analytics is the use of use of mathematical, 
statistical, and artificial intelligence techniques for classification and 
prediction.1 We will use predictive systems for systems using the 
techniques of predictive analytics. Such systems have already yielded 
significant benefits and we take it for granted that they will continue to 
do so and are in part for that reason well-entrenched.2 Indeed, their “all-
encompassing scope already reaches the very heart of a functioning 
society.”3 We focus on a subset of predictive systems — those used to 
predict individual human actions. In this case especially, 
[T]he accountability mechanisms and legal standards that 
govern decision processes have not kept pace with 
technology. The tools currently available to policymakers, 
legislators, and courts were developed primarily to oversee 
human decisionmakers. Many observers have argued that our 
current frameworks are not well adapted for situations in 
which a potentially incorrect, unjustified, or unfair outcome 
emerges from a computer. Citizens, and society as a whole, 
have an interest in making these processes more accountable. 
                                                          
1 This characterization of predictive analytics is sufficient for our purposes. There is no agreement 
on the precise meaning of predictive analytics and related terms like data mining, machine 
learning, artificial intelligence, neural nets, and deep learning. See, e.g., STEVEN FINLAY, 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING FOR BUSINESS: A NO-NONSENSE GUIDE TO 
DATA DRIVEN TECHNOLOGIES 5-16, 27-59 (2nd ed. 2017) (distinguishing and discussing 
relationships among machine learning, predictive analytics, data mining, artificial intelligence, 
neural nets, and deep learning); VIJAY KOTU & BALA DESHPANDE, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS AND 
DATA MINING: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE WITH RAPIDMINER 13-15 (2014) (discussing relations 
between data mining and predictive analytics). 
2 See FOSTER PROVOST & TOM FAWCETT, DATA SCIENCE FOR BUSINESS: WHAT YOU NEED TO 
KNOW ABOUT DATA MINING AND DATA-ANALYTIC THINKING 1 (2013).  
3 ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS: THE POWER TO PREDICT WHO WILL CLICK, BUY, LIE, 
OR DIE 293 (2016). Siegel identifies 182 different types of use. Id. at 191.  A short list of examples 
includes the extension of credit, marketing and advertising, judicial sentencing and parole 
decisions, searching travelers, auditing taxpayers, police scrutiny of individuals and 
neighborhoods, welfare and financial aid, public health decisions, employee hiring, visa decisions, 
political campaign decisions, business planning and supply chain management, call center 
treatment, employee scheduling, evaluation of teachers, and ranking of the value of customers for 
differential treatment. See generally Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. 
L.  REV. 633, 662-63 n. 97 (2017); CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG 
DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016); FINLAY, supra note 1, at 9 
(“Today, machine learning is being applied to a huge range of problems. In fact, almost any aspect 
of life that involves decision making in one form or another.”). 
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If these new inventions are to be made governable, this gap 
must be bridged.4  
We divide the bridge-building task into three parts. What features 
of predictive systems significantly contribute to unfair or otherwise 
objectionable outcomes? How should one regulate those features? 
Lastly, how can one ensure that predictive systems sufficiently respect 
human freedom? The third question requires some explanation. The 
essential point is that you are not free when you are subject to the 
arbitrary will of another. Predictive systems are no exception. 
Predictive systems violate your freedom when they push you down an 
arbitrary and capricious path, and — importantly for our purposes — 
they also violate your freedom when you are left with no practical 
alternative but to submit to the decisions without knowing whether 
there are adequate reasons for them, reasons that at a minimum show 
that the decisions are not arbitrary and capricious. You are not free if 
you are subject to the will of another and denied knowledge of whether 
that will is arbitrary and capricious. Respecting human freedom 
requires meeting, or at least sufficiently closely approximating, the 
following Knowledge Condition: those subject to decisions of another 
are able with reasonable effort to know that there is an adequate 
justification for the decisions.5 
We answer the first question about objectionable features by 
“profiling” predictive systems. We adapt the idea of profiling people. 
A profile of a person is a summary of characteristics relevant to 
evaluating and predicting the person’s behavior.6 Our predictive 
systems profile consists of five computational design features that 
significantly affect the extent to which a system will yield unfair or 
otherwise objectionable decisions. A computational design feature is a 
feature that is part of the computational strategy for generating an 
                                                          
4 Kroll et al., supra note 3, at 636 (footnotes omitted). 
5 Compare Devan R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust But Verify: A Guide To Algorithms and the 
Law, 31 HARV. J. L. TECH. 1, 9 (2017) (Desai and Kroll formulate the requirement in terms of 
dignity: “dignity [i.e. our freedom] requires those who are subject to such a process know or 
understand what reasons are behind a decision.” The difference between their formulation and 
ours is largely verbal.), with JERRY L. MASHAW, REASONED ADMINISTRATION AND DEMOCRATIC 
LEGITIMACY: HOW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SUPPORTS DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 177 (2018). 
(noting that “reason-giving is critical to treating individuals as free moral agents subject to 
legitimate coercion only to the extent that appropriate reasons can be given for restricting their 
freedom of action”). We assume that respecting human freedom is intrinsically desirable, but also 
that one can in some cases justify restricting it on consequentialist grounds. 
6 See, e.g., JOE NAVARRO & MARVIN KARLINS, WHAT EVERY BODY IS SAYING: AN EX-FBI 
AGENT’S GUIDE TO SPEED-READING PEOPLE (2008) (detailing profiling based on nonverbal 
cues). 
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intended result. The features in the profile are non-technical ones 
accessible to those unfamiliar with predictive analytics.7   
We answer the second question by explaining how to regulate the 
features the profile identifies. Along with others, we suggest the 
Federal Trade Commission as the regulatory agency.8 Our novelty is 
the use of FTC regulation to create a type of norm extensively studied 
in game theory, a coordination norm. We suggest using such norms to 
coordinate consumer or seller activity in ways that create market 
incentives to minimize unfair or otherwise objectionable decisions. Our 
answer to the second question is the basis for our answer to the third. 
We appeal to coordination norms to explain how to meet the 
Knowledge Condition. Our second and third answers are sketches — 
sufficient for our purposes, but not full explanations.9 We offer them 
as a way to begin a discussion about how to use an explicit profile to 
regulate predictive systems in ways that avoid objectionable 
consequences while also meeting the Knowledge Condition. We 
confine our attention to commercial contexts. Government surveillance 
raises related but distinct concerns. Much of what we say remains 
relevant, however.  
 Section I identifies features of predictive systems that lead to 
results that are both unfair and offenses to human freedom. Section II 
raises the question of the extent to which current predictive systems 
exhibit those features. It answers the question by constructing a profile 
of predictive systems. Section III shows how coordination norms can 
facilitate the fulfillment of the Knowledge Condition. Section IV 
explains how to create norms governing predictive system that ensure 
that predictive systems do not exhibit the objectionable features 
                                                          
7 In this way, our profile differs from prior scholars’ characterizations of policy issues of the sort 
Ryan Calo usefully offers. See Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 
51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 399, 407-9 (2017). The work closest to our proposal is David Lehr & Paul 
Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 669-70 (2017). We share with Lehr and Ohm a computational design 
focused characterization of predictive systems based on a thorough technical understanding of 
predictive systems. We also share similar views on data collection and preparation, problem 
definition, and the use of proxies. We differ in excluding from our profile more technical details 
of model selection, training, and evaluation. This allows us to give a profile that is fully general 
(as Lehr and Ohm note, some of their characterizations apply only to certain types of systems) 
and accessible to those not well versed in technical details. The two characterizations are 
complementary. 
8 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for 
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 20 (2014) (advocating for the FTC to oversee the 
use of data mining and predictive analytics in credit-scoring systems). 
9 For a detailed explanation, see ROBERT H. SLOAN & RICHARD WARNER, THE PRIVACY FIX: 
HOW TO PRESERVE PRIVACY IN THE ONSLAUGHT OF SURVEILLANCE (forthcoming 2020). 
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Section I identifies while also ensuring that the Knowledge Condition 
is fulfilled. 
I. WHY IS PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS SO TROUBLING? 
Predictive systems can lead to objectionable outcomes, but so can 
governments and markets. What makes predictive analytics 
particularly worrisome? We answer by identifying four features of 
predictive analytics that are cause for serious concern.  
A. Alien Intelligence 
We identify those features with a thought experiment. Imagine 
aliens from outer space land. They are beneficent (or at least well 
intentioned) aliens who come in peace. One of their first acts is to 
provide their human hosts with a collection of predictive analytics and 
artificial intelligence systems that predict future individual human 
actions. Call them collectively AI, for alien intelligence. Humans — 
businesses, governments, and individuals — embrace the program, and 
many (humans) propose using AI systematically in the widest possible 
range of contexts as a basis for decisions based on its classification and 
prediction. Would that be a good idea? That depends on the features of 
AI.  
We assume the AI has the following features (for convenience, 
we describe AI as making decisions even though it is the humans using 
it who decide):  
• Low accuracy: AI’s classifications and predictions are 
more accurate than human predictions (even with human 
predictive systems). But, like human systems, it still has 
a high error rate in a significant number of cases.10  
• Opacity: Humans have no explanation or understanding 
of why AI predicts what it does. Even the best human 
computer science experts find large parts of AI 
                                                          
10 See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Police Are Using Computer Algorithms to Tell if 
You’re a Threat, TIME (Oct. 3, 2017), http://time.com/4966125/police-departments-algorithms-
chicago/ (addressing how the racial bias, history of police interaction, and other factors can skew 
an algorithm that calculates and individual’s numerical “threat score” in Chicago.). See also 
Jessica Saunders, Priscillia Hunt & John S. Hollywood, Predictions Put into Practice: A Quasi- 
Experimental Evaluation of Chicago’s Predictive Policing Pilot, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 347, 363 (2016) (Chicago Strategic Subject List (“SSL”) algorithm, meant to 
identify potential shooting perpetrators and victims “identified less than 1 % of homicide 
victims”); Strategic Subject List, CITY OF CHICAGO (Dec. 7, 2017), 
https://data.cityofchicago.org/Public-Safety/Strategic-Subject-List/4aki-r3np (the seeding data 
set for the aforementioned Chicago SSL algorithm). 
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completely opaque. It appears to involve unknown 
programming and statistical techniques.  
• Broad-based predictions: What happens in virtually any 
area of one’s life may serve as input to classifications and 
predictions affecting virtually any other area (what you 
pay for insurance, whether you get hired, what schools 
you get in to, and so on).  
• Data feedback without error correction: AI’s decisions 
affect what happens to people in the future, and that 
information feeds back into AI as input for subsequent 
decisions. AI does not, however, have mechanisms that 
detect and correct its errors. Data feedback without error 
correction combines with broad-based predictions to 
create mistaken and uncorrectable tracks of winners 
(those whom AI’s decisions advantage) and losers (those 
disadvantaged). Losers find it difficult to escape that role 
as negative classifications feed data into AI that yields 
further negative classifications.  
Should one use such a system as widely as possible to predict 
individual human action? It may seem obvious that one should not. AI 
creates winners and losers in ways that are mostly mistaken and 
uncorrectable, massively unfair, and as a prescription for social unrest, 
practically unwise. That does not settle the matter, however. After all, 
could not one justify using AI by showing that its benefits to society 
outweigh its costs? We understand benefits and costs broadly includes 
both quantifiable considerations and non-quantifiable ones (such as 
unfairness and social unrest). Many believe we can justify the extensive 
use of human predictive systems in just this way. For example, 
Because of the margin of uncertainty that edges all . . . 
[statistical] decisions, at least when honestly reached, we must 
collectively shoulder the burden of hope and fear [of being 
rightly or wrongly categorized], just as we must collectively 
submerge personal experience into public statistics and 
collectively stomach the possibility of local injustice in the 
name of global justice.11 
Can AI can be justified in this way? If AI were not opaque, 
proponents of AI could try the following approach: show that AI takes 
all (or most) relevant costs and benefits into account, and then 
adequately justify the way in which the AI balances them. AI’s opacity 
blocks this approach. Humans do not know what costs and benefits AI 
                                                          
11 GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., THE EMPIRE OF CHANCE: HOW PROBABILITY CHANGED SCIENCE 
AND EVERYDAY LIFE 291 (1989). 
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considers, and its algorithm is opaque to humans. This leaves a single 
alternative: justifying AI by the consequences of the decisions it makes.  
One, by no means small, problem is that AI makes no decisions 
before it is used, so the proponents cannot justify its initial use. It 
follows that even beginning to use AI is an offense to human freedom 
since fulfilling the Knowledge Condition requires a knowable 
justification for using AI. But, suppose for the sake of argument, 
humans do start using AI. Then this argument would be available; (1) 
in the past, the benefits of using AI outweigh the costs, and (2) it is 
likely that that they will continue to do so. It is possible for (1) to be 
true. Suppose AI allows us to cure diseases, to restore the climate, 
eliminate starvation, and order social relations in ways that yield a 
vibrant culture in which all have satisfying opportunities for self-
realization. However, AI’s results are likely to be much more mixed 
given that it creates winners and losers in mostly mistaken and 
uncorrectable ways. Massive unfairness and mistaken allocation of 
rewards and penalties is unlikely to generate net benefits. (2) is also 
problematic; a system’s predictions are a function of the data it takes 
as input and the algorithm it employs.12 Both will change as the aliens 
update the algorithm from time to time. Those changes can make AI’s 
past decisions an uncertain guide to its future ones. The changes will 
be necessary because “predictive models tend to deteriorate over time 
— their ability to predict gets worse as economic, market and social 
change occurs. The relationships that were found between the predictor 
data and the outcome data when the model was originally constructed 
no longer apply.”13   
We assume there is no adequate justification for beginning to use 
or continuing to use AI. It follows that that the Knowledge Condition 
is not fulfilled, and that using AI is an offense to freedom.  
B. Comparing Human-Created Systems 
We should avoid using AI and sufficiently similar systems. This 
raises the following question: to what extent do human-created systems 
exhibit low accuracy, opacity, broad-based predictions, and feedback 
without error correction? The profile answers that question by 
identifying computational design features that meet three conditions: 
                                                          
12 See, e.g., JOHN D. KELLEHER & BRENDAN TIERNEY, DATA SCIENCE 143-144 (2018) (“Two 
major factors contribute to the [prediction] … that an ML [machine learning] algorithm will 
generate from a data set. The first is the data set the algorithm is run on . . . . The second factor 
… is the choice of ML algorithm.”). 
13 STEVEN FINLAY, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS, DATA MINING AND BIG DATA: MYTHS, 
MISCONCEPTIONS AND METHODS 79 (2014). 
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first, they are widely shared by current systems; second, they are 
reasonably accessible to legislators, governmental agencies, and 
researchers; third, they significantly affect the extent to which a system 
will exhibit low accuracy, opacity, broad-based predictions, and lack 
of error-correction. Our focus is broader than, but complementary to 
the focus on the use of classifications of race, gender, and sexual 
orientation.14 As important as those examples are, they are also aspects 
of the more general problem we discuss. 
II. PROFILING PREDICTIVE SYSTEMS 
The profile consists of five computational design features: (1) 
level of accuracy; (2) how the data is collected and prepared; (3) choice 
classificatory and predictive targets; (4) the use of proxies to make 
classifications and predictions; (5) feedback — data feedback into the 
system and the presence or lack of error correction. This profile is 
sufficient for our purposes. For other purposes, one may want to alter 
or extend it. We consider these five computational design features in 
turn. 
A. Level of Accuracy 
The level of accuracy feature answers the question, “How 
accurate is the predictive system?”15 Systems vary widely in 
accuracy.16 Our concern, however, is with low accuracy systems 
predicting individual human action. This is why we stipulated that AI 
is highly inaccurate in a significant range of cases. The point was to 
make it similar to human-created systems that predict individual human 
action. Those systems are also highly inaccurate in a significant 
number of cases.17 We offer two examples: direct mail advertising and 
the Chicago Police Department’s Strategic Subject List algorithm.  
In direct mail advertising, the task is to predict which consumers 
will respond positively (purchasing, signing up for a credit card, and so 
                                                          
14 For greater focus on invidious discrimination, see generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK 
BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015). 
15 For our purposes it is sufficient to understand accuracy as the percentage of correct predictions. 
The use of accuracy in predictive analytics is more sophisticated and distinguishes among true 
positives (TP), false positives (FP), true negatives (TN) and false negatives (FN). Then, where 
TOTAL = TP + FP + TN + FN, one can define accuracy as (TP + TN)/TOTAL and define the 
error rate as (FP + FN)/TOTAL. See, e.g., KOTU & DESHPANDE, supra note 1, at 259. 
16 See generally HANNAH FRY, HELLO WORLD: BEING HUMAN IN THE AGE OF ALGORITHMS 
(2018). 
17 See, e.g., FINLAY, supra note 13, at 6 (“[M]ost predictive models are quite poor at predicting 
how someone is going to behave”). See generally, O’NEIL, supra note 3 (discussing a number of 
cases of inaccurate predictions).  
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on) to an advertisement.18 Humans are notoriously poor at identifying 
positive responders.19 If a company, unaided by predictive analytics, 
mails an offer to a list of people, and with whom it has no prior 
relationship, about 1 percent of them will respond positively.20 Using 
predictive analytics can improve the response rate by 20 to 30 
percent.21 That is still an error rate of 70 to 80 percent; however, in this 
case, improved predictive power can translate into increased 
profitability. If a direct mail marketer finds it profitable to mail with a 
1 percent response rate, an improvement to 4 percent promises a 
significant increase in profitability.22   
The Chicago Police Department’s (CPD’s) Strategic Subject List 
algorithm creates “a risk assessment score known as the Strategic 
Subject List or ‘SSL.’ These scores reflect an individual’s probability 
of being involved in a shooting incident either as a victim or an 
offender.”23 The initial data consists information about arrests 
“contained within the CPD data warehouse.”24 Using that data, the 
algorithm constructs “social networks . . . to previous homicide victims 
to predict the likelihood of someone becoming a victim of a 
homicide.”25 The network is a “co-arrest” network. Chicago uses two 
types of co-arrests corresponding to two types of links in the network: 
A “first-degree” link refers to a relationship between a subject 
 and an individual with whom the subject was previously co-
                                                          
18  See Hal Conick, How to Use Direct Mail in the Modern Marketing Mix, MARKETING NEWS, 
Sept. 2018, 14, 16. 
19 See KELLEHER & TIERNEY, supra note 12, at 153 (“Human intuition about customers can often 
miss important nonobvious segments or not provide the level of granularity that is required for 
nuanced marketing.”). 
20 See FINLAY, supra note 13, at 7. 
21 Id. at 11. 
22 In general, the most favorable cases for the use of highly inaccurate predictive systems meet 
three conditions: (1) humans are even worse at prediction; (2) there is significantly increased 
benefit from improved prediction accuracy; (3) the costs of false positives and false negatives are 
low. The use of predictive analytics in direct mail marketing plausibly fulfils all three. Credit 
scoring is another example, a 20-30 percent improvement in credit scoring translates into granting 
20-30 percent fewer loans to customers who would have defaulted or 20-30 percent more loans 
to good customers who will repay, depending upon how one decides to use the model. To put this 
in terms of raw bottom line benefit, if a bank writes off $500m in bad loans every year, then a 
reasonable expectation is that this could be reduced by at least $100m, if not more, by using 
predictive analytics. See id. at 2-6.  
23 Strategic Subject List, supra note 10. There is only one independent study of Chicago’s SSL 
system, see Saunders et al., supra note 10, at 354 (evaluating the “pilot program developed in 
collaboration between the Chicago Police Department (CPD) and the Illinois Institute of 
Technology (IIT).”). Our discussion concerns that system, which has since undergone further 
development. 
24 Saunders et al., supra note 10, at 354. 
25 Id. at 354. 
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 arrested who later became a homicide victim. A "second-
 degree” link refers to a relationship in which a subject was 
co- arrested with another person who, in turn, was co-arrested 
with a later homicide victim.26  
The underlying theory is that the more connections a person has to co-
arrested individuals the more likely one will commit homicide or be a 
victim of one (depending on the nature of the links).27  
The Strategic Subject List algorithm “identified less than 1% of 
homicide victims (3 out of 405).”28 The case for using such systems is, 
to say the least, far less clear than the case for predictive analytics in 
direct mail advertising since the costs of focusing police attention on 
the wrong people can be very high. Unfortunately, “what happens when 
law enforcement agencies shift their analytic focus from street corners 
to people is unknown in the world of data-driven policing because there 
have been few formal evaluations . . .”29  
Why is low accuracy a characteristic of systems that predict 
individual human action? The answer provides an important insight 
into the difficulties of using predictive analytics to predict individual 
action and also provides a transition to the next feature of the profile, 
data collection and preparation.  
The fundamental reason is that the predictor data is 
decontextualized. An example illustrates what we mean by 
decontextualization; a social worker was tasked with the following:  
doing data entry for a contractor who was developing a 
tracking system for young people who were under state 
supervision. The frustration that finally drove her to quit the 
job was that the architecture of the database didn’t allow 
social service workers to include narrative information about 
the context of kids’ behavior. Simply, the system tracked each 
student’s “success” or “failure” in a number of different 
programs. So, for example, if students stopped going to an 
afterschool program because they faced a serious crisis — a 
death in the family or an apartment fire, for example — a 
caseworker worker was forced to check a box that reported 
                                                          
26 Id.  
27 Id.  
28 Id. at 363. 
29 ANDREW V. PAPACHRISTOS & MICHAEL SIERRA-ARÉVALO, OFFICE OF COMMUNITY 
POLICING SERVICES, POLICING THE CONNECTED WORLD:  USING SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
IN POLICE-COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS 22 (2018). However, the accuracy of the bail and 
sentencing algorithm is unclear. See Jordan Pearson, Bail Algorithms Are as Accurate as 
Random People Doing an Online Survey, MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 17, 2018), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/paqwmv/bail-algorithms-compas-recidivism-are-as-
accurate-as-people-doing-online-survey. 
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that they failed to complete the program. Because there was 
no input box for narrative case notes, there was literally no 
place in the system to account for the (sometimes pages of) 
contextual information written in the social workers' 
reports.30 
The complaint is that the categories omit the contextual 
information necessary to understand and explain why the student acted 
as he or she did.31 We explain human action through narratives that 
integrate values, purposes, intentions, and the context in which they 
occur into a meaningful pattern. One could, of course, add a checkbox 
for “death in the family” or “apartment fire,” but that would still fail to 
capture the values, purposes, and intentions behind the student’s 
reaction to those events. No set of checkboxes, however elaborate, will 
constitute a narrative integrating context, values, purposes, and 
intentions into a meaningful pattern. 
Contextually rich narratives are the “data” on which human 
beings based their predictions and explanations of others’ actions. As 
a further illustration, imagine two scenarios in which you are trying to 
predict whether Victoria will remain married to Victor once their 
children graduate from college. In the first, you know that Victoria’s 
publicly observable behavior has been typical for a spouse in a twenty-
year long first marriage, and you know that about 40 percent first 
marriages end in divorce. Can you predict Victoria’s action? Will she 
divorce? The most the data allows you to do is make the statistical 
prediction that there is a forty percent chance of divorce. Compare 
knowing that Victoria regards her marriage as loveless, places a large 
disvalue on remaining in loveless relationships, and intends to divorce 
Victor when their children graduate from college. With the much 
context filled in, you can confidently predict that Victoria will divorce 
Victor. 
Contrast the data for predictive analytics. As we explain in detail 
in the next subsection, it is decontextualized in the way the tracking 
system for supervised youth example illustrates. That is no accident. 
Decontextualization is inevitable in statistical explanation. To make 
statistical predictions about people, you look for regularities that hold 
with some degree of probability for people in certain categories. To 
achieve this goal, one abstracts from the enormous variation in 
individuals’ life histories and looks for reliable correlations between 
                                                          
30 VIRGINIA EUBANKS, DIGITAL DEAD END: FIGHTING FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE 95 (2011). 
31 See generally Machiel Keestra, Understanding Human Action: Integrating Meanings, 
Mechanisms, Causes, and Contexts, in CASE STUDIES IN INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH 225 
(Allen F. Repko, William H. Newell & Rick Szostak eds., 2011). 
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categories that are independent of the idiosyncratic paths people traced 
to get into those categories.32 It is no surprise then that predictive 
systems predicting individual human action are inaccurate.  
Some may object that we have missed the point. Is one of the key 
points of predictive analytics that the computer’s ability to sift through 
massive amounts of data enables predictive analytics to do what 
humans cannot? Will a massive amount of decontextualized data allow 
a system to predict individual action? Not yet, at least. Current 
predictive analytics cannot make reasonably accurate predictions about 
human action by extracting information about values, purposes, and 
intentions from decontextualized data and then reasoning about what 
behavior that information predicts. Professor Barbara J. Grosz observes 
about currently popularly deep-learning33 approaches to predictive 
analytics:  
[T]hese systems are really good at statistical learning, pattern 
recognition and large-scale data analysis, but they don’t go 
below the surface. They can’t reason about the purposes 
behind what someone says. Put another way, they ignore the 
intentional structure component of dialogue. Deep-learning 
based systems more generally lack other hallmarks of 
intelligence: they cannot do counterfactual reasoning or 
common-sense reasoning.34 
Data decontextualization is a key factor in the explaining the low 
accuracy of systems predicting human action. Data decontextualization 
                                                          
32 See GIGERENZER ET AL., supra note 11, at 184 (“In social science, as opposed to molecular 
physics, it is possible to trace individual life histories and, as we may (counterfactually) grant for 
the sake of the argument, explain them in terms of determining causal chains. But for the 
sociological purpose of explaining the overall structure of a society and its changes, this 
‘historical’ or ‘dynamical’ treatment . . . would have to give way to a structural treatment, one 
form of which is statistics. In order for a statistical treatment to make sense, the overall structures 
must be invariant with respect to changes in the many detailed histories (of molecules or of 
people).”). 
33 See FINLAY, supra note 1, at 128-29 (“‘Deep’ neural networks (Deep learning/Deep belief 
networks) are very large and complex neural networks (often containing thousands or millions of 
artificial neurons) which are used for ‘AI’ tasks such as speech recognition and in self-driving 
cars. . . . [Neurons are the key component] of a neural network . . . . [A] neuron is a linear model 
whose score is then subject to a (non-linear) transformation. A neural network can therefore be 
considered as a set of interconnected linear models and non-linear transformations.”) 
34 MARTIN FORD, ARCHITECTS OF INTELLIGENCE: THE TRUTH ABOUT AI FROM THE PEOPLE 
BUILDING IT 338 (2018). The mathematician Hannah Fry makes a similar point: 
Although AI has come on in leaps and bounds of late, it is still only ‘intelligent’ in the 
narrowest sense of the word. It would probably be more useful to think of what we’ve been 
through as a revolution in computational statistics than a revolution in intelligence. . . . [That 
is] a far more accurate description of how things currently stand. 
FRY, supra note 16, at 12. 
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occurs during data collection and preparation, which is the next feature 
in the profile.   
B. Data Collection and Preparation 
The “data preparation” component of the profile answers the 
following question: what data is collected in the first place, and then 
what is kept and what is eliminated? The answer matters: “[e]verything 
that isn’t counted as relevant is then marginalized and rendered 
invisible to our models.”35 Data collection and preparation renders 
contextual information invisible in five ways: collection, selection, 
cleaning, structuring, and choice of attributes. The processes typically 
overlap and interact,36 but, for convenience, we treat them as separate 
and distinct. Those processes create the decontextualized “reality” 
which a predictive system uses to make its predictions.37 The 
elimination of data involved in collection and selection is significant 
for three reasons. First, it contributes to inaccuracy by 
decontextualizing the information. Second, as we explain below when 
discussing opacity, it can lead to the failure of the Knowledge 
Condition. Third, it can create objectionable bias in the predictive 
system, as we explain when discussing the classificatory and predictive 
targets part of the profile.  
1. Collection and Selection 
Data preparation begins with data collection, a starting point that 
is already a stream of decontextualized data. Much of the information 
in databases comes from the data detritus people leave behind. Those 
leftovers are hardly precise indicators of the contexts of their creation. 
To see why, note that the data typically divides into meaningful content 
and data about the content (metadata, information about the time of 
creation or transmission, device used, and so on).  
The content does not fully (or often even significantly) indicate 
the relevant context. When communicating content, people assume that 
they and their audiences understand a background that includes the 
relevant context, values, purposes, and intentions. They do not make 
that background explicit in the communication, and even a full record 
of the words and images exchanged would not capture it.  
It may seem that metadata, however, captures a great deal of 
contextual information. Email metadata, for example, can include 
                                                          
35 CATHY O’NEIL, ON BEING A DATA SKEPTIC loc. 99 (2013) (ebook). 
36 See KELLEHER & TIERNEY, supra note 12, at 58-60. 
37 Id. at 66 (“With regard to getting the right data for a project, a survey of data scientists in 2016 
found that 79 percent of their time is spent on data preparation.”). 
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sender's name, email and IP address, recipient's name and email 
address, plus a great deal more.38 It is indeed true that aggregating 
metadata can reveal a great deal about people,39 but it typically does 
not reveal an explanatory pattern of values, purposes, and intentions. 
Consider this search metadata for example: 
 
[2018/03/09 18:34:44] abortionfacts.com 
[2018/03/09 18:35:23] plannedparenthood.org 
[2018/03/09 18:42:29] dcabortionfund.org 
[2018/03/09 19:02:12] maps.google.com 
 
The data reveals a user’s concern with abortion, but it does not 
reveal why. The searcher could be a woman seeking an abortion, a pro-
abortion activist, an anti-abortion activist, or an academic researcher. 
You can eliminate some of these possibilities by adding more data (for 
example, that the searcher is male), but no compilation of data, 
however extensive, will constitute an integrated narrative revealing 
values, purposes, and intentions. As Shoshana Zuboff notes, data 
collection practices  
render the entire world’s actions and conditions as behavioral 
flows. Each rendered bit is liberated from its life in the social, 
no longer inconveniently encumbered by moral reasoning, 
politics, social norms, rights, values, relationships, feelings, 
contexts, and situations. In the flatness of this flow, data are 
data, and behavior is behavior.40 
In creating a predictive system, the next step after data collection 
is data selection. It is rare for all the collected data to be used. Instead, 
one picks and chooses. As the data scientist Steven Finlay explains:  
One feature of Big Data is that most of it has a very low 
information density, making it very difficult to extract useful 
customer [or other] insights from it. A huge proportion of the 
Big Data out there is absolutely useless when it comes to 
forecasting consumer [or other] behavior. You have to work 
pretty hard at finding the useful bits that will improve the 
                                                          
38 Rebecca Greenfield, What Your Email Metadata Told the NSA about You, THE ATLANTIC 
(June 27, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/06/email-metadata-
nsa/313842/. 
39 See generally Jonathan Mayer, Patricia Mutchler & John C. Mitchell, Evaluating the Privacy 
Properties of Telephone Metadata, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5536 (2016). 
40 SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN 
FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 211-12 (2019). 
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accuracy of your predictive models . . . 41  
One selects data that will serve one’s predictive goals. One 
is looking for reliable correlations between categories that are, as 
we put it earlier, independent of the idiosyncratic paths people 
traced to get into those categories. Thus, to the extent that 
collected data is not relevant to the predictive task at hand, one 
does not include it in the predictive system. This further liberates 
data “from its life in the social, no longer inconveniently 
encumbered by moral reasoning, politics, social norms, rights, 
values, relationships, feelings, contexts, and situations.”42  
2. Cleaning and Structuring 
Cleaning and structuring are processes through which selected 
data gets organized, altered, and placed into a database. They are key 
processes that help construct the database “reality.” In discussing 
cleaning and structuring, we will use this simple example of a 
traditional relational database,43 organized as a table of rows and 
columns:  
 
Owner Make  Model Occupation City Age 
John 
Smith 
Mazda Miata Teacher Chicago 44 
Joe 
Friday 
Ford Fairlane Police 
Officer 
Los 
Angeles 
39 
 
Each row contains a data set referring to a single item or “record,” 
in this case car owners and their car. Each column consists of one 
“attribute” of an item. In this case, ‘Owner’, ‘Make’, ‘Model’, 
‘Occupation’, and ‘City’ are all “attributes” of the records. Entries 
indicate the values of attributes; for example, Joe Friday owns a Ford 
Fairlane, is a police officer living in Los Angeles, and is thirty-nine 
years old. Note that nothing in the database reveals the contextually 
rich narrative that explains why, at age thirty-nine, Friday became a 
Police Officer, owns a Ford Fairlane, and lives in Los Angeles.   
                                                          
41 FINLAY, supra note 13, at 14. See also id. at 161 (“Whatever data you have, wherever it has 
come from, whether it’s structured or unstructured, data in its raw form is not often very useful 
for prediction. Usually, there is far greater merit in deriving new types of data from it rather than 
using it as it is.”). 
42 ZUBOFF, supra note 40, at 211. 
43 For a discussion of databases, see generally ABRAHAM SILBERSCHATZ, HENRY F. KORTH & S. 
SUDARSHAN, DATABASE SYSTEM CONCEPTS (6th ed. 2010). 
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Structuring puts data in the proper form to include in a database. 
As Finlay notes, building a predictive system requires structuring the 
data appropriately:  
All of the methods used to create predictive models require 
data to be well structured, and the data must be categorical 
(e.g. occupation, marital status and gender) or numeric (e.g. 
age, income and time at address). A predictive model can’t be 
built if the data is not in one of these two formats.44 
Getting the data in the proper form typically requires cleaning it:  
Data is dirty, filthy, messy stuff. Often it’s incorrect, missing 
or badly formatted, particularly where humans have been 
involved in creating and/or collecting it. Sometimes numeric 
data is held as text, or text data is forced into fixed-length 
fields resulting in some data being truncated, and so on. 
Consequently, a lot of the time and effort . . . can be spent 
“cleaning” the data before it’s ready to be used.45  
Cleaning and structuring the data may eliminate or alter 
information when properly formatting it, interpreting truncated data, 
fitting data into fixed length fields, discarding records that have some 
missing attributes or making up values for the missing attributes, and 
in correcting or discarding information seen as incorrect. To take just 
one example, “[i]f unstructured data such as text or images have been 
considered for inclusion, then suitable text/image analytics will have 
been applied to extract the useful bits, so as to create a suitable 
structured representation of that data.”46 
To summarize, cleaning and structuring data removes context and 
frequently also alters or removes some data.  
3. Choosing Attributes 
Choosing attributes is the process of determining the labels for the 
top of the database. In our earlier example, the attributes are Owner, 
Make, Model, Occupation, City, and Age: 
 
Owner Make  Model Occupation City Age 
John 
Smith 
Mazda Miata Teacher Chicago 44 
Joe Friday Ford Fairlane Police 
Officer 
Los 
Angeles 
39 
                                                          
44 Finlay, supra note 13, at 177. 
45 Id. at 160. 
46 Finlay, supra note 13, at 165. 
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In the case of predictive analytics, a predictive goal guides the 
choice of attributes. “The role of the data analyst is to create 
informative features: those would allow the learning algorithm to build 
a model that predicts well.”47 Suppose you want to predict when 
current car owners will buy another car. You have a wealth of data 
about current car owners, including their names of owners, the makes 
and models of their current cars, their ages, occupations, and cities of 
residence. To the extent you have reason to think that that information 
plays a significant role in predicting when an owner will buy another 
car, you have reason to pick Owner, Make, Model, Occupation, City, 
and Age as attributes.  
Our deliberately simple example involves just six attributes. But, 
as Finlay notes (talking about variables, another term for attributes):  
For many projects there are potentially millions of . . . 
variables that could be considered — far more than any 
analytical system can deal with. Therefore, an important part 
of the model-building phase is using business [or other 
relevant] knowledge to come up with ideas as to what types 
of . . . variables one should consider.48 
Choosing variables and filling in their values for each identifier in 
the database constructs the decontextualized database “reality” that 
will serve as the data input to the systems predictions. 
Data preparation is an important source of opacity (which, as the 
aliens’ system AI illustrates, can be a bar to fulfilling the Knowledge 
Condition).  
4. Opacity 
We define opacity as follows; a predictive system is opaque to the 
extent one cannot identify the factors that determine its predictions and 
explain (in a human-understandable way) how those factors yield the 
predictions. On a narrow view, just two factors determine a predictive 
system’s classifications and predictions: the database and the algorithm 
run on that database.49 We understand opacity more broadly to include 
the preparation of the database as a factor. The rationale is that what is 
omitted from or altered in database may be an important factor in 
explaining a system’s predictions, as the following example illustrates.  
                                                          
47 ANDRIY BURKOV, THE HUNDRED-PAGE MACHINE LEARNING BOOK 43-44 (2019) (emphasis in 
original). 
48 Finlay, supra note 13, at 162. 
49 See, e.g., KELLEHER & TIERNEY, supra note 12, at 143-144. (“Two major factors contribute to 
the [prediction] … that an ML [machine learning] algorithm will generate from a data set. The 
first is the data set the algorithm is run on . . . . The second factor … is the choice of ML 
algorithm.”). 
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Suppose Sally defaults on a $50,000 credit card debt. When the 
credit card company begins collection procedures, she declares 
bankruptcy. Roger also defaults on a $50,000 credit card debt and 
declares bankruptcy. Sally incurred her debt to pay for lifesaving 
treatment for her eight-year old daughter. Roger incurred his debt 
through compulsive gambling, an addiction which has resisted years of 
attempted cures. Suppose that post-bankruptcy, Sally is a good credit 
risk. Her daughter is well with no further expenses expected, and she 
is earning a good income that considerably exceeds her expenses. 
Roger, however, remains a poor risk. Imagine a credit-scoring 
predictive system that predicts that both Sally and Roger are similar 
risks because of their bankruptcies. There are two explanations. One 
appeals to just the database and the algorithm. Given the bankruptcy 
information in the database, Sally and Roger look roughly the same to 
the algorithm which then classifies them similarly. The second 
explanation adds an additional fact to the first, a fact that was omitted 
from the system’s database; Sally’s bankruptcy was the result of a 
medical emergency. The system sees Sally and Roger as similar risks 
because it ignores the different contextual explanations of why Sally 
and Roger went bankrupt. The second explanation is relevant to 
regulating predictive systems to the extent that one wants to impose 
requirements on what databases must, may, and must not contain. 
Unfortunately, the information needed for explanations of the 
second sort is rarely available and hence predictive systems are in this 
way typically opaque. Businesses routinely guard both the database (as 
well as the predictive system itself) as trade secrets, and even when the 
database is available, you typically do not know what data was 
discarded or altered in the processes of collection, selection, cleaning, 
and structuring. Our focus on database opacity may surprise some. 
Discussions of the opacity typically focus on the algorithm, not the 
database.50 Those discussions see the algorithm’s unavailability and 
the complexity of its source code as the cause of opacity. It is 
unavailable because businesses typically guard it as a trade secret. Even 
when it is available, it is typically so complex that “[t]he source code 
of computer systems is illegible to nonexperts. In fact, even experts 
often struggle to understand what software code will do: inspecting 
source code is a very limited way of predicting how a computer 
                                                          
50 See e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 14. Pasquale does contend that “without access to the 
underlying data and code, we will never know what type of tracking is occurring, and how the 
discrimination problems long documented in ‘real life’ may even now be insinuating themselves 
into cyberspace.” Id. at 40. But his main concern is with source code, and it is not clear that he 
has in mind the preparation of the database as distinct from the end result of the database itself.  
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program will behave.”51 We do not disagree. Our point is that databases 
should join source code as a cause of opacity.  
C. Classificatory and Predictive Targets 
One typically designs a predictive system in order to make one or 
more types of classifications or predictions. The “classificatory and 
predictive targets” part of the profile answers the question, what and 
how does the system classify and predict? To discuss this part of the 
profile, we first discuss three concepts — explainability, opacity, and 
transparency — and then explain their potential regulatory relevance. 
1. Explainability, opacity, and transparency 
In the computer science literature, the availability of an answer to 
the question is an issue of explainability.52 A predictive system is 
explainable if one can provide an adequate, human-understandable 
characterization and explanation of its classifications and predictions, 
where explanation appeals to just two factors: the particular database 
involved, and the particular algorithm used. Some predictive systems 
are typically explainable; others are not. Decision trees are an example 
of an explainable algorithm.53 One can readily characterize the output. 
For example, “our system will predict that the 20-something will go to 
the movies if their parents are visiting, otherwise play tennis if it's 
sunny and not windy, go to the movies if it's sunny, windy, and they 
don't have much money . . . " Once a prediction is made, a human-
understandable explanation of why that prediction was made for that 
particular predictor data is typically readily available. On the other 
hand, deep neural nets and support vector machines, for example, are 
sufficiently complex that they usually are not explainable. 
A system is transparent if it is not at all opaque; so, opaque versus 
transparent are sliding scale opposites. Full transparency requires 
explainability — a human-understandable explanation of why the 
system generates its classifications and predictions — but 
explainability is not sufficient. A system may be both explainable and 
opaque. The decision tree system we imagined above, for example, is 
                                                          
51 Kroll et al., supra note 3, at 638. 
52 See generally Mark G. Core et al., Building Explainable Artificial Intelligence Systems, in 
PROC. OF THE TWENTY-FIRST NAT’L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1766 (2006); David 
Gunning, Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), DARPA, 
https://www.darpa.mil/program/explainable- artificial-intelligence (last visited Apr. 6, 2019); 
Wojciech Samek, Thomas Wiegand & Klaus-Robert Müller, Explainable Artificial Intelligence: 
Understanding, Visualizing and Interpreting Deep Learning Models, ARXIV (Aug. 28, 2017), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1708.08296.pdf. 
53 See, e.g., Finlay, supra note 1, at 44. 
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explainable but would be opaque if relevant details about the 
construction of its database were unavailable.  
Explainability and opacity versus transparency are relevant to 
regulation. One may want to require explainability but not transparency 
in some cases (for example, to allow the use of opaque but explainable 
decisions trees in some case) and in other cases one may want to limit 
opacity by imposing requirements on the construction of the database.  
One might well be concerned with both explainability and broader 
issues of transparency in responding to predictive systems that generate 
a numerical ranking that purports to predict a consumer’s value to a 
business.54 As eBureau, one of the companies offering such scoring, 
explained, “eBureau’s patented technology analyzes vast amounts of 
predictive data to help you with critical decisions throughout the 
customer lifecycle.”55 Here is how eBureau (now a part of Transunion) 
worked: 
A client submits a data set containing names of tens of 
thousands of sales leads it has already bought, along with the 
names of leads who went on to become customers. EBureau 
then adds several thousand details — like age, income, 
occupation, property value, length of residence and retail 
history — from its databases to each customer profile. From 
those raw data points, the system extrapolates up to 50,000 
additional variables per person. Then it scours all that data for 
the rare common factors among the existing customer base. 
The resulting algorithm scores prospective customers based 
on their resemblance to previous customers.56 
Businesses use e-scores to determine how to treat consumers in a 
variety of situations: 
A growing number of companies, including banks, credit and 
debit card providers, insurers and online educational 
institutions are using these scores to choose whom to woo on 
the Web. These scores can determine whether someone is 
pitched a platinum credit card or a plain one, a full-service 
cable plan or none at all. They can determine whether a 
customer is routed promptly to an attentive service agent or 
                                                          
54 See, e.g., Natasha Singer, Secret E-Scores Chart Consumer Buying Power, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
18, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/19/business/electronic-scores-rank-consumers-by-
potential-value.html. Numerical rankings as output are not confined to e-scores. In general, a 
“model’s predictions are almost always represented by a single number — a score.” STEVEN 
FINLAY, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS IN 56 MINUTES 4 (2015) (emphasis in original). 
55 About Us, EBUREAU, http://www.ebureau.com/about 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20171016113624/http://www.ebureau.com/about] (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2019). 
56 Singer, supra note 54. 
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relegated to an overflow call center.57  
The scoring systems raise concerns about both opacity and 
explainability. Concerns about opacity arise because information about 
data preparation is unlikely to be available since the will be almost 
certainly be guarded as a trade secret. Concerns about explainability 
arise because the scoring systems frequently use classification 
algorithms with poor explainability. For example, they may use 
clustering to sort consumers into “similarly behaving” groups.58 A 
“significant weakness of clustering [models] . . . is their complexity 
and ‘black box’ nature. You can’t tell by looking at these types of 
model what variables contributed significantly to the model score and 
which did not.”59 eBureau’s system, for example, is likely complicated 
enough that a detailed picture of what it predicts is difficult if not 
impossible to obtain. “With eScores’ automated statistical modeling 
software, over 25,000 variables are commonly incorporated in the 
model development process, generating superior score performance. 
eBureau’s highly scalable system allows the number of modeling 
attributes to grow as eBureau’s data resources expand.” 60 
2. Training data bias 
Choices of classificatory and predictive targets can have 
objectionably discriminatory results. We consider two examples. One 
concerns the general use of training data in the machine learning 
approach known as supervised learning that is used in developing all 
or almost all predictive analytics systems.61 The second example is the 
Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions  
(COMPAS), a bail and sentencing algorithm that, incidentally, was 
created using supervised learning, but that is not the point we 
emphasize here.62 COMPAS also illustrates a problem inherent in its 
underlying data. 
                                                          
57 Id. 
58 See O’NEIL, supra note 3, at 145 (“[E-scores] carry out thousands of ‘people like you’ 
calculations. And if enough of these ‘similar’ people turn out to be deadbeats or, worse, criminals, 
that individual will be treated accordingly.”). 
59 Finlay, supra note 13, at 124. 
60 eScores Data Sheet, EBUREAU (2010), 
http://www.ebureau.com/sites/all/files/file/datasheets/ebureau_escore_datasheet.pdf 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20160208005758/http://www.ebureau.com/sites/all/files/file/datas
heets/ebureau_escore_datasheet.pdf].  
61 See FORD, supra note 35, at 18. 
62 See Moritz Hardt, Eric Price & Nathan Srebro, Equality of Opportunity in Supervised 
Learning, in PROC. OF THE THIRTIETH CONF. ON NEURAL INFO. PROCESSING SYS. 3323 (2016) 
(discussing criteria for fairness that arise in supervised learning systems such as COMPAS). 
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Supervised learning requires that you have some data available 
that includes the outcome data you want to classify or predict. For 
example, you want to predict who will default on credit card debt and 
you have data from some past cases, showing the types of people who 
did and did not default on credit card debt. The overall goal is to build 
a predictive system that will give good answers on new data where the 
outcome data is not available to you, for example, new credit card 
applicants. In supervised learning, you collect data — the training data 
— and choose a type of classification or prediction algorithm (e.g., 
clustering, decision trees, or neural nets) for your predictive system. 
Then, corresponding to each type of classification or prediction 
algorithm is one or more training algorithms that convert the training 
data into a classification or prediction algorithm.63 As other scholars 
have shown, bias in the training data will translate into bias in the 
predictions made when the algorithm is in use.64 
A classic example is St. George’s Hospital Medical School in 
London.65 In the 1970’s, it developed a computer program to “cull 
down the two-thousand applications to five-hundred, at which point 
humans would take over.”66 They trained the program on the years of 
human-rated applications it had in its records. The program developed 
its criteria from the training data and thereby incorporated the human 
biases reflected in that data.67 “In 1988, the British government’s 
Commission for Racial Equality found the medical school guilty of 
racial and gender discrimination in its admissions policy.”68 
3. Another Form of Bias in the Data 
The judicial bail and sentencing algorithm COMPAS illustrate 
another source of bias.69 COMPAS predicts the likelihood that a person 
convicted of a crime will commit another in the future. Of course, it is 
extremely undesirable for a system like COMPAS to exhibit racial bias. 
Thus, one would hope COMPAS would have the following two 
                                                          
63 Typically, one runs a training algorithm on part of the training data and sees how well the 
resulting prediction algorithm predicts outcome data for the remaining training data. If the 
predictions are not as accurate as desired, one can repeatedly make various adjustments or try 
other training algorithms. See generally TOM M. MITCHELL, MACHINE LEARNING (1st ed. 1997); 
BURKOV, supra note 47. 
64 O’NEIL, supra note 3, at 115-118. 
65 Id. at 115-116. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 117. 
69 Jeff Larson & Julia Angwin, Bias in Criminal Risk Scores Is Mathematically Inevitable, 
Researchers Say, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/bias-in-
criminal-risk-scores-is-mathematically-inevitable-researchers-say. 
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features: first, COMPAS makes equally accurate predictions regardless 
of race; second, it makes false positive and false negative mistakes at 
the same rate for all racial groups.70 The problem is that it is 
mathematically impossible to meet both these conditions if the 
fractions of people who commit crimes differ for racial groups.71 This 
is currently the situation in the United States where African Americans 
commit more crimes than whites (a result of centuries of systematic 
discrimination).72 The consequences of the conditions the COMPAS 
system implemented? “[B]lack defendants were far more likely than 
white defendants to be incorrectly judged to be at a higher risk of 
recidivism, while white defendants were more likely than black 
defendants to be incorrectly flagged as low risk.”73   
4. Infeasible Classifications and Predictions 
The classifications and predictions a system is designed to make 
should be feasible. Current teacher rating systems fail to meet this 
requirement. Those systems use “value-added” as the predictive target. 
It is a simplification, but still essentially correct, to characterize the 
systems as measuring value-added by measuring the performance of 
students on two standardized tests, one at the beginning of instruction, 
the other at the end.74 The difference in scores is the “value-added.” It 
is clear that value-added systems fail to distinguish good from bad 
teachers — often classifying bad as good and good as bad.75 There are, 
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nonetheless, “a slew of proprietary models, being sold for the most part 
by private education consulting companies, that purport to measure the 
‘value added’ by a given teacher through the testing results of their 
students from year to year.”76  
D.   Proxies  
One uses proxies when one cannot directly measure the things 
relevant to the predictions one would like to make. Suppose, for 
example, a teacher is interested in the length of time students pay 
attention in class. She cannot directly measure paying attention, so she 
uses proxies: taking notes, looking at material displayed on the board, 
and so on. The “proxy” dimension of a system’s profile is determined 
by the answer to the question, “What are the proxies, and how wide 
reaching are the predictions they support?”  
1. Broad-based Predictions 
Auto insurance illustrates broad-based predictions. As a 
Consumer Reports study of rates notes, “behind the rate quotes is a 
pricing process that judges you less on driving habits and increasingly 
on socioeconomic factors. These include your credit history, whether 
you use department-store or bank credit cards, and even your TV 
provider.”77 For example, “[i]n New York State . . . a dip in a driver’s 
credit rating from ‘excellent’ to merely ‘good’ could jack up the annual 
cost of insurance by $255.”78 Grant, for the sake of argument which 
may well not be true,79 that there is some statistical correlation between 
credit scores and driving safety. A normative question remains: should 
a drop in your credit score raise your car insurance premium no matter 
what the reason for the drop? A variety of scenarios can lead to a 
reduced credit rating, and in some one may think the debtor’s actions 
praiseworthy — for example, incurring debt to pay for a child’s 
education or health care. Especially in those cases, why should the 
events in one area of one’s life penalize one in another? The more 
predictive systems use proxies that reach across a variety of areas of a 
person’s life, the more a negative classification by one system can lead 
to a negative classification by another. This can make it quite difficult 
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to recover from financial or personal difficulties as lower ratings in 
some areas generate lower ratings in others. As one commentator notes, 
“as more of our life is quantified . . . proxy judgments can get more 
esoteric yet more intrusive. Better prediction can lead to subtler and 
more nefarious discrimination.”80 
2. Explainability 
The use of proxies can create explainability issues. Recall that 
eBureau’s “automated statistical modeling software . . . allows the 
number of modeling attributes to grow as eBureau’s data resources 
expand.”81 If the automated growth creates proxies, there is no 
guarantee that eBureau will know what they are. Without that 
knowledge, they may be unable to provide a human-understandable 
explanation of how the system reaches its classifications and 
predictions.  
E.    Feedback Mechanisms 
The “feedback” dimension of the profile asks different two 
questions, “Does the system have a mechanism for error correction?”, 
and “Do the classifications and predictions of the system have 
consequences that create information that feedback into the data on 
which the system bases future classifications and predictions?” 
1. Error Correction 
Without error-correcting feedback, a predictive system “can 
continue spinning out faulty and damaging analysis while never 
learning from its mistakes.”82 Suppose, for example, that Amazon’s 
predictive systems “started recommending lawn care books [primarily] 
to teenage girls, the clicks would plummet . . . ”83 Monitoring click 
rates, however, provides error correcting feedback, and “the algorithm 
would be tweaked until it got it right.”84  
Unfortunately, many human predictive systems lack error-
correcting feedback. E-scores are a good example. Suppose a business 
uses e-scores to decide which callers to route to a person, and which 
callers to route to a series of voice prompts. It is not likely to have a 
way to determine it consigned a potentially valuable customer to an 
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infuriating series of voice prompts. Even if it did, it is unlikely to have 
a way to enter that information in an error correcting way into the e-
score system. Additional examples of lack of error-correcting feedback 
include teacher rating systems,85 judicial sentencing algorithms,86 
predictive policing systems,87 US News and World Report rankings of 
colleges and universities,88 and pre-hiring screening systems.89 
2. Feedback into Predictor Data 
Now we turn to the question of whether the classifications and 
predictions of the system have consequences that create information 
that feedbacks to create additional predictor data. This is typical of 
“[m]achine-learned models for recommendation, ranking, and spam 
detection [that] all become obsolete unless they are regularly infused 
with new data.”90 Data feedback, especially when combined with lack 
of error correction and broad-based predictions, creates mistaken and 
uncorrectable tracks of winners and losers.  
F. Avoiding Human-Created Alien Intelligence 
Can we regulate the features in the profile in a way that fulfills the 
Knowledge Condition: those subject to predictive systems are able with 
reasonable effort to know that there is an adequate justification for the 
decisions? Further, can we do so in ways that ensure that human-
created systems do not exhibit the features that make AI objectionable? 
Our answer to both questions assigns a key regulatory role to the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). We explain how to use FTC actions 
to create norms. The norms create market incentives for businesses to 
use predictive systems with profiles that minimize the objectionable 
features of AI and also ensure that the Knowledge Condition is fulfilled.   
We begin with the Knowledge Condition. 
III. FULFILLING THE KNOWLEDGE CONDITION 
Respecting human freedom requires fulfilling, or adequately 
approximating, the Knowledge Condition. This requirement may seem 
impossible to fulfill. When a 25,000 variable, constantly updated e-
score system shunts a consumer into a long series of voice mail 
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prompts, how is he or she supposed to determine whether there is an 
adequate justification for his or her treatment? In this section, we 
explain in general how norms can provide an answer to such questions. 
In the next section, we sketch a regulatory proposal that leads to norms 
that provide an answer to that question in the case of predictive 
systems. 
A. Coordination Norms 
The norms that concern us are coordination norms, a subspecies 
of norms generally. Family holiday dinners illustrate coordination 
norms. Imagine a congenial family, all of whose members share the 
goal of a harmonious dinner. As everyone realizes, this requires a 
selective flow of information. There are things one can tell Aunt Jane 
that must not reach Uncle John’s ears, and so on. The family members 
know and observe the required strictures. The example illustrates three 
conditions that, when generalized, define coordination norms: (1) 
There is a behavioral regularity: family members collectively ensure 
the desired selective flow of information; (2) They adhere to that 
regularity to achieve a shared goal: harmonious relations; (3) They 
conform only as long as enough other members do so. Only collective 
conformity can ensure harmony. So, unless enough family members 
conform, there is little point in any one member’s conforming. In 
general, a coordination norm is a behavioral regularity in a group, 
where the regularity exists at least in part because everyone thinks that, 
in order to realize a shared goal, he or she ought to conform to the 
regularity as long as everyone else does.  
For another example, imagine you are about to enter an elevator 
with two people already in it. They are standing near the opposite walls 
roughly in line with each other. Where do you stand? Behind them and 
equidistant from them. Why? Because that is the norm. The elevator 
norm is to stand as far away as you can from the person nearest to you. 
More fully, the behavioral regularity is that elevator users maximize 
the distance from the person nearest them to realize the shared goal of 
using elevators while minimizing the sense of overcrowding. The 
regularity exists because people think they ought to conform to the 
norm to realize the goal as long as they trust others do. If others just 
stand where they like, being a unilateral distance maximizer is 
pointless; it does not prevent overcrowding. 
We are concerned with a subclass of coordination norms — those 
that are also informational norms. Informational norms are social 
norms that constrain the collection, use, and distribution of 
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information.91 The family holiday dinner illustrates a coordination 
norm that is also an informational norm. In general,   
[Informational] norms circumscribe the type or nature of 
information about various individuals that, within a given 
context, is allowable, expected, or even demanded to be 
revealed. In medical contexts, it is appropriate to share details 
of our physical condition or, more specifically, the patient 
shares information about his or her physical condition with 
the physician but not vice versa; among friends we may pour 
over romantic entanglements (our own and those of others); 
to the bank or our creditors, we reveal financial information; 
with our professors, we discuss our own grades; at work, it is 
appropriate to discuss work-related goals and the details and 
quality of performance.92  
As Nissenbaum’s examples illustrate, the contextual constraints 
on information flows vary with the social roles of the actors. The 
constraints are, as we will say, role-appropriate. Role-appropriate 
constraints create selective flows of information, different selective 
flows for different roles. The selectivity implements a tradeoff; it 
secures the benefits of information processing to an extent and protects 
privacy to an extent. 
Not all information norms are also coordination norms, but the 
ones that concern us are. We offer two examples. To avoid 
misunderstanding, we should note that we describe the examples as if 
governmental and private sector surveillance were not a significant 
factor (a more or less mid-Twentieth Century description). This 
simplifying assumption is legitimate since the goal of this section to 
show how it is possible for norms to facilitate the fulfillment of the 
Knowledge Condition. The next section sketches a procedure for 
making that possibility a reality.  
The first example concerns restaurants and their customers. There 
is a behavioral regularity; restaurants process customer information 
only in role-appropriate ways, where it is role-appropriate for the 
restaurant to collect, use, and distribute customers’ personal 
information to meet the customers’ restaurant needs. Further, 
restaurants and customers conform to the regularity because think they 
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should in order realize the shared goal of meeting customers’ restaurant 
needs as long as they trust each other to do so.  
For the second example, suppose Victoria is visiting a brick-and-
mortar bookstore. Here, there is a behavioral regularity; bookstores 
process customer information only in role-appropriate ways. It is role-
appropriate for the bookstore to collect, use, and distribute customers’ 
personal information to meet the customers’ bookstore needs. 
Furthermore, bookstores and customers participate in role-appropriate 
information processing to realize the shared goal of meeting customers’ 
bookstore needs. They do so as long as they trust others to do so. 
B. Fulfilling the Knowledge Condition 
Victoria in the bookstore illustrates how informational 
coordination norms facilitate the fulfillment of the Knowledge 
Condition. She knows the bookstore will process some range of 
personal information. The Knowledge Condition is fulfilled if she is 
able with reasonable effort to know that there is an adequate 
justification for the information processing. To see that this condition 
is fulfilled, first ask, what exactly does Victoria want to know? What 
would count for her as an adequate justification? We assume that 
Victoria and consumers generally want to know if the tradeoff between 
benefits and costs is acceptable — where “benefits” and “costs” include 
both quantitative and non-quantitative considerations. Victoria knows 
that the tradeoff is acceptable provided she knows two things; her 
transaction with the bookstore is governed by an appropriate 
informational coordination norm, and the tradeoffs that norm 
implements are acceptable. She knows the norm as a result of growing 
up in (or become acculturated to) a particular society. As the 
sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann emphasize in their 
foundational work, The Social Construction of Reality: 
In the common stock of knowledge there are standards of role 
performance that are accessible to all members of a society, 
or at least to those who are potential performers of the roles 
in question. This general accessibility is itself part of the same 
stock of knowledge; not only are the standards of role X 
generally known, but it is known that these standards are 
known. Consequently, every putative actor of role X can be 
held responsible for abiding by the standards, which can be 
taught as part of the institutional tradition and used to verify 
the credentials of all performers and, by the same token, serve 
as controls.93 
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How does Victoria know that the norm-implemented tradeoff is 
acceptable? We assume that informational coordination norms are 
acceptable provided they evolve in sufficiently competitive market 
conditions under appropriate normative and regulatory constraints. As 
long as Victoria has reason to think such conditions hold, she knows 
that the norms are acceptable. We emphasize that norms may be 
acceptable in this sense but inconsistent with an individual’s or group’s 
values. Acceptability (as we use the term) is a minimal standard. 
Tension between acceptable norms and other values is an important 
dynamic that motivates critique and social change. The point to 
emphasize is that Victoria fulfills the Knowledge Condition without 
needing to expend any effort to determine what information the 
bookstore collects, nor what it does with it. She knows that whatever it 
does, it is acceptable.  
Can one replicate this result for, for example, a 25,000 variable, 
constantly updated e-score system?  
C. Predictive Analytics, Norms, and the Knowledge Condition 
That would require informational coordination norms that govern 
the use of predictive analytics, and such shared norms generally do not 
exist. The existence of such a norm requires that the parties coordinate 
to create a selective flow information in order to achieve a shared goal, 
and such goals typically do not exist. Consider insurance companies 
that set premiums using “your credit history, whether you use 
department-store or bank credit cards, and even your TV provider.”94 
The insurer’s goal is to maximum their profits. Do the customers share 
that goal, or some other relevant goal, with the companies? That is 
unlikely. Few will know how insurance companies use predictive 
analytics, and even if they did, the intense privacy debates over the use 
of predictive analytics would be sufficient to show that there is no 
agreement on a relevant shared goal.  
How should public policy proceed given that uses of predictive 
analytics are often not governed by relevant informational coordination 
norms? One attractive answer is to create norms that ensure that the 
Knowledge Condition is fulfilled while also regulating the features in 
the profile in ways that ensure that human predictive systems do not 
exhibit the objectionable features of AI.  
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IV. CREATING NORMS 
One must do two things to create a coordination norm: first, 
ensure that people conform to a behavioral regularity; second, ensure 
that they do so in part because they think they ought to as long as others 
do in order to realize a shared goal. A combination of education and 
regulation can achieve those ends. 
A. Norm Creation Through Education and Regulation 
Anti-littering campaigns are a good example of how education 
and regulation can create a coordination norm.95 The coordination 
norm involved is not an informational coordination norm, but we will 
show how to adapt the process to informational norms. In the early 
1950s, almost everyone littered even though almost everyone desired 
a litter-free environment, but as long as everyone littered, 
individually taking the time and effort to use waste receptacles would 
not make the environment cleaner, and people preferred littering to 
expending pointless time and effort.96 An intensive advertising 
campaign combined with legal liability led to a non-littering 
coordination norm.97 It convinced people they ought not to litter in 
order to realize the shared goal of a cleaner environment, and, for that 
reason, people generally began to use and expect others to use waste 
receptacles. Littering is one of many examples of the creation of 
coordination norms. The Nobel Prize winning economist Elinor 
Ostrom98 and the philosopher Christina Bicchieri99 discuss a number 
of examples.  
We propose a similar process of education and regulation for 
predictive analytics. The proposed norm creation strategy is built 
around the FTC’s standard for an unfair business practice: a predictive 
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system should not cause or be likely to cause “substantial injury to 
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves 
and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to 
competition.”100 The first step is to explain the relevant notion of a 
norm. 
B. Creation Norms for Predictive Analytics 
We sketch an educational and regulatory procedure for creating a 
norm covering the use of proxies (such as credit scores) in setting auto 
insurance premiums and then suggest how to generalize to other 
features of the profile. A reasonable norm in the auto insurance case 
would be to use proxies only in ways that are sufficiently predictive of 
driving safety. Note that being “sufficiently predictive” is not just a 
matter of the predictive reliability of the proxies. It is also a normative 
question since the use proxies can make what you do in one area of 
your life have consequences in another.101 
We suggest the following procedure as a plausible norm-creation 
process. First, the FTC should hold companies liable for an unfair 
business practice for using proxies in ways insufficiently predictive of 
auto safety. FTC enforcement starts the norm-creation process by 
ensuring that the following behavioral regularity obtains at least some 
auto insurance companies set premiums using sufficiently predictive 
proxies, and at least some consumers purchase polices with such 
premiums. FTC decisions help define what counts as “sufficiently 
predictive.” 
To create the norm from that point, one needs to do three more 
things. First, extend the regularity to (almost) all insurance companies 
and (almost) all consumers buying auto insurance. Second, ensure that 
companies and consumers share the goal of companies offering and 
consumers buying polices based on sufficiently predictive proxies. 
Third, ensure that, in order to realize that goal, companies and 
consumers conform to the regularity because they think they ought to 
conform as long as enough others do.  
The first step toward realizing these goals is to convince 
consumers that insurance companies ought to use only sufficiently 
predictive proxies. Thus, through educational campaigns, convince 
consumers that insurance companies should use only sufficiently 
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predictive proxies.102 As a result, consumers begin to demand insurance 
premiums based on such proxies.  
While it is not inevitable, this combination could lead to insurance 
companies responding by offering such premiums. They think they 
ought to in order to meet consumer demand (and thereby ensure 
adequate revenue).  
Eventually, the informational coordination norm exists. First, 
there is a behavioral regularity; insurance companies use only 
sufficiently predictive proxies. Second, companies and customers 
conform to the regularity because think they ought to in order realize 
the shared goal of using only sufficiently predictive proxies, and third, 
they trust each other to do so. 
One could create norms for the other parts of the profile in similar 
ways. A plausible norm for the “feedback” part would be that there 
should be adequate error-correcting feedback. For “data preparation,” 
one norm would be that the information in the database should be 
sufficiently predictive, where “sufficiently predictive” is again in part 
a normative notion. For the “predictive target” part of the profile, we 
suggest a norm requiring predictive targets to meet appropriate 
standards of fairness, explainability, lack of opacity, and feasibility. 
For the accuracy part of the profile, we suggest that a norm that requires 
that there be a sufficiently reliable correlation between a systems 
predictor data and its output data.  
CONCLUSION 
We could create norms in the way suggested, but it would require 
a significant commitment of resources to educational campaigns and 
FTC regulation. Does society have the political and social will to do 
that? If not, it does not mean that norms will not evolve. Coordination 
norms evolve in response to repeated interactions in which the parties 
give and take from each other.103 The danger is that, as norms evolve, 
habituation to current business practices will lead people to accept what 
now seems objectionable, and norms will arise that give businesses 
very wide latitude in the use of predictive analytics.104 Now is the time 
to intervene in that process.  
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